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ABSTRACT
Greybox fuzzing is a lightweight testing approach that effectively
detects bugs and security vulnerabilities. However, greybox fuzzers
randomly mutate program inputs to exercise new paths; this makes
it challenging to cover code that is guarded by complex checks.
In this paper, we present a technique that extends greybox fuzzing
with a method for learning new inputs based on already explored
program executions. These inputs can be learned such that they
guide exploration toward specific executions, for instance, ones that
increase path coverage or reveal vulnerabilities. We have evaluated
our technique and compared it to traditional greybox fuzzing on 26
real-world benchmarks. In comparison, our technique significantly
increases path coverage (by up to 3X) and detects more bugs (up to
38% more), often orders-of-magnitude faster.
1 INTRODUCTION
There is no doubt that test case generation helps find bugs and
security vulnerabilities, and therefore, improve software quality. It
is also clear that manual test case generation is a cumbersome and
very time-consuming task. As a consequence, there has emerged a
wide variety of automatic test case generation tools, ranging from
random testing [28, 29, 50], over greybox fuzzing [3, 7], to dynamic
symbolic execution [20, 33].
Random testing [28, 29, 50] and blackbox fuzzing [4, 9] generate
random inputs to a program, run the program with these inputs,
and check whether any bugs were found, e.g., whether the pro-
gram crashed or a user-provided property was violated. Despite
their practicality, the effectiveness of random testing and black-
box fuzzing, that is, their ability to explore new paths, is limited.
The search space of valid program inputs is typically huge, and a
random exploration can only exercise a small fraction of (mostly
shallow) program paths.
At the other end of the spectrum, dynamic symbolic execu-
tion [20, 33] and whitebox fuzzing [19, 31, 34] repeatedly run a
program, both concretely and symbolically. At runtime, they collect
symbolic constraints on program inputs from branch statements
along the execution path. These constraints are then appropriately
modified and a constraint solver is used to generate new inputs,
thereby steering execution toward another program path. Although
these techniques are very effective in covering new paths, they sim-
ply cannot be as efficient and scalable as other test case generation
techniques that do not spend any time on program analysis and
constraint solving.
Greybox fuzzing [3, 7] lies in the middle of the spectrum between
performance and effectiveness in discovering new paths. It does
not require program analysis or constraint solving, but it relies on a
lightweight program instrumentation that allows the fuzzer to tell
when an input exercises a new path. In other words, the instrumen-
tation is useful in computing a unique identifier for each explored
path in a program under test. American Fuzzy Loop (AFL) [7] is
a prominent example of a state-of-the-art greybox fuzzer that has
detected numerous bugs and security vulnerabilities [1].
A greybox fuzzer, like AFL, starts by running the program under
test with a seed input. During execution of the program, the fuzzer
computes the identifier of the path that is currently being explored.
It then mutates the seed slightly to generate a new input and runs
the program again. If a new path is exercised, the input is added to
a set of seeds, otherwise it is discarded. From this set of seeds, the
fuzzer picks new inputs to mutate. The process is repeated until a
timeout is reached or until the user aborts the exploration.
Despite the fact that greybox fuzzing strikes a good balance
between performance and effectiveness in automatic test case gen-
eration, the inputs are still mutated in a random way, for instance,
by flipping random bits. As a result, many generated inputs ex-
ercise the same program paths. To address this problem, there
have emerged techniques that direct greybox fuzzing toward low-
frequency paths [18], vulnerable paths [54], deep paths [64], or
specific sets of program locations [17]. Specifically, such techniques
have focused on which seed inputs to prioritize and which parts of
these inputs to mutate.
Our approach. In this paper, we present an orthogonal ap-
proach that systematically learns new inputs for the program under
test with the goal of increasing the performance and effectiveness
of greybox fuzzing. In contrast to existing work, our approach sug-
gests concrete input values based on information from previous
executions, instead of performing arbitrary mutations. The new
inputs are learned in a way that aims to direct greybox fuzzing to-
ward optimal executions, for instance, executions that flip a branch
condition and thus increase path coverage. Our technique is para-
metric in what constitutes an optimal execution, and in particular,
in what properties such an execution needs to satisfy.
More specifically, each program execution can be associated
with zero or more cost metrics. A cost metric captures how close
the execution is to satisfying a given property at a given program
location. Executions that minimize a cost metric are considered
optimal with respect to that metric. For example, one could define
a cost metric at each arithmetic operation in the program such that
the metric becomes minimal (i.e., equal to zero) when an execution
triggers an arithmetic overflow. Then, any execution that leads to
an overflow is optimal with respect to the cost metric it minimizes.
Note that cost metrics can either be computed automatically, as in
the example above, or provided by the user.
Our algorithm uses the costs that are computed along executions
of the program under test to learn new inputs that lead to optimal
executions. As an example, consider that method foo , shown below,
is the program under test. (The grey box on line 3 should be ignored
for now.)
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1 void foo(int x) {
2 x = x - 7;
3 minimize (|x - 42|);
4 if x == 42 { vulnerability (); }
5 }
The problem revealed by this code is typical of black- or greybox
fuzzers: it is difficult to generate a value for input x that drives the
program through the vulnerable path. For the sake of this example,
we assume the cost metric to be the absolute value of x - 42,
shown on line 3, which defines optimal executions as those that
cover the then-branch of the if-statement. Now, let us imagine that
none of the first few executions of this program cover the then-
branch. Although these executions are not optimal with respect to
the cost metric of line 3, they are still useful in learning a correlation
between the input values of x and their corresponding costs (as
computed on line 3). Based on this approximate correlation, our
algorithm proposes a new value for x (namely 49), which minimizes
the cost on line 3. In contrast, existing greybox fuzzing techniques
randomly mutate x hoping to cover the vulnerable path.
Another way to think about our algorithm is the following. Given
a set of cost metrics, the program under test is essentially a function
from inputs to costs, costs = f (inputs), which precisely describes
the correlation between inputs and the corresponding costs. In
this context, our greybox fuzzing algorithm collects data points of
the form (inputs, costs) from executions of the program under test,
and it then approximates the function that correlates them. If the
approximation is precise enough, this technique is able to suggest
inputs that lead to optimal executions by purely reasoning about
the much simpler, approximated function.
We implemented our algorithm in a tool architecture that can be
instantiated with any cost metric. As a result, our architecture is
flexible enough to capture different notions of what constitutes an
optimal execution. In our instantiation of the tool architecture, we
consider two kinds of cost metrics, (1) ones that areminimizedwhen
execution flips a branch condition, and (2) ones that are minimized
when execution is able to modify arbitrary memory locations. In
comparison to traditional greybox fuzzing, our approach is able to
significantly increase path coverage (by up to 3X) and detect many
more vulnerabilities (up to 38% more), often orders-of-magnitude
faster.
Contributions. Our paper makes the following contributions:
– We introduce a greybox fuzzing algorithm that learns new
inputs to guide exploration toward optimal program execu-
tions.
– We implement this algorithm in a tool architecture that may
be instantiated with different notions of optimality.
– We evaluate our technique on 26 real-world benchmarks and
demonstrate that it is more effective than traditional greybox
fuzzing.
Outline. The next section reviews traditional greybox fuzzing
and gives an overview of our approach through a running example.
Sect. 3 explains the technical details of our approach, while Sect. 4
describes our implementation. We present our experimental eval-
uation in Sect. 5 and threats to the validity of our experiments in
Sect. 6. We discuss related work in Sect. 7 and conclude in Sect. 8.
Algorithm 1 Greybox Fuzzing
Input: Program prog, Seeds S
1 PIDs← RunSeeds(S, prog)
2 while ¬Interrupted() do
3 input ← PickInput(PIDs)
4 energy ← 0
5 maxEnergy ← AssignEnergy(input)
6 while energy < maxEnergy do
7 input′ ← FuzzInput(input)
8 PID′ ← Run(input′, prog)
9 if IsNew(PID′, PIDs) then
10 PIDs← Add(PID′, input′, PIDs)
11 energy ← energy + 1
Output: Test suite Inputs(PIDs)
2 OVERVIEW
In this section, we first describe traditional greybox fuzzing and
then compare with our approach through a running example.
2.1 Background: Greybox Fuzzing
Fuzzing comes in three main flavors depending on how much the
fuzzer is allowed to look at the structure of the program under
test. Blackbox fuzzers [4, 9], like random testing tools, execute the
program under test without leveraging any information about its
structure. On the other hand, whitebox fuzzers [19, 31, 34], like
dynamic symbolic execution tools, use program analysis and con-
straint solving to understand the entire structure of the program
under test and, therefore, explore more paths.
Greybox fuzzers, like AFL [7] or LibFuzzer [3], leverage only some
structure of the program under test, which they obtain with light-
weight program instrumentation. By obtaining more information
about the program structure, greybox fuzzing can be more effective
than blackbox fuzzing in finding bugs. In comparison to whitebox
fuzzing, greybox fuzzing spends less time acquiring information
about the program structure and, as a result, it is more efficient.
Alg. 1 shows how greybox fuzzing works. The fuzzer takes as
input the program under test prog and a set of seeds S . It starts
by running the program with the seeds, and during each program
execution, the instrumentation is able to capture the path that is
currently being explored and associate it with a unique identifier
PID (line 1). Note that the PIDs data structure is a key-value store
from a PID to an input that exercises the path associated with PID.
Next, an input is selected for mutation (line 3); the selection can
be either random or based on heuristics, for instance, based on the
number of times an input has already been mutated. The selected
input is then assigned an “energy” value that denotes how many
times the selected input should be fuzzed (line 5).
The input is mutated (line 7), and the program is run with the
new input (line 8). If the program follows a path that has not been
previously explored, the new input is added to the test suite (lines 9–
10). The above process is repeated until an exploration bound is
reached (line 2), for instance, a timeout, a maximum number of
generated inputs or seeds, etc. The fuzzer returns a test suite con-
taining one test case for each program path that has been explored.
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1 int bar(a, b, c: int) {
2 var d = b + c;
3 minimize(d < 1 ? 1 - d : 0);
4 minimize(d < 1 ? 0 : d);
5 if d < 1 {
6 minimize(b < 3 ? 3 - b : 0);
7 minimize(b < 3 ? 0 : b - 2);
8 if b < 3 {
9 return 1;
10 }
11 minimize(a == 42 ? 1 : 0);
12 minimize(a == 42 ? 0 : |a - 42|);
13 if a == 42 {
14 return 2;
15 }
16 return 3;
17 } else {
18 minimize(c < 42 ? 42 - c : 0);
19 minimize(c < 42 ? 0 : c - 41);
20 if c < 42 {
21 return 4;
22 }
23 return 5;
24 }
25 }
Figure 1: Running example.
As shown here, the program instrumentation is useful in determin-
ing which inputs to retain for inclusion in the test suite and further
fuzzing.
2.2 Running Example
Fig. 1 shows a simple, constructed program that wewill use through-
out the paper to demonstrate the benefits of our approach. Function
bar takes as input three integers a, b, and c and returns an inte-
ger. There are five paths in this function, all of which are feasible.
Each path is denoted by a unique return value. (The grey boxes are
discussed below and should be ignored for now.)
When running traditional greybox fuzzing (more specifically,
AFL) on function bar, only four out of five program paths are
explored within 12h. During this time, greybox fuzzing constructs
a test suite of four inputs, each of which explores a different path in
bar. The path with return value 2 remains unexplored even after
the fuzzer generates about 311M different inputs. All but four of
these inputs are discarded as they exercise a path in bar that has
already been covered by a previous test case.
The path with return value 2 is not covered because greybox
fuzzers randomly mutate program inputs (line 7 of Alg. 1). More
generally, it is challenging for fuzzers to generate inputs that satisfy
“narrow checks”, that is, checks that only become true for very few
input values, like the check on line 13 of the running example. In
this case, the probability that the fuzzer will generate the value 42
for input a is 1 out of 232 for 32-bit integers. Even worse, to cover
the path with return value 2 (line 14), the sum of inputs b and c
needs to be less than 1 (line 5) and b must be greater than or equal
to 3 (line 8). As a result, several techniques have been proposed to
Program prog, Seeds S , Cost function fcost
Greybox Fuzzer Input Learner
Test suite
new inputs
inputs, costs
new inputs
Figure 2: Overview of the workflow and tool architecture.
guide greybox fuzzing to satisfy such narrow checks, for instance,
by selectively applying whitebox fuzzing [65].
In contrast, our greybox fuzzing approach is able to guide test
case generation toward optimal program executions without any
program analysis or constraint solving. For instance, to ultimately
maximize path coverage, the grey boxes in Fig. 1 define cost metrics
that are minimized when execution flips a branch condition. For
this example, our algorithm explores all five program paths within
only 0.27s and after generating only 372 different inputs.
2.3 Approach
This effectiveness of our technique on the running example be-
comes possible by making traditional greybox fuzzing a lighter
shade of grey. In other words, our fuzzing algorithm has access to
more information about the program under test than traditional
greybox fuzzing, which is enough to guide exploration toward
specific executions.
The workflow and tool architecture of our greybox fuzzer is
shown in Fig. 2. The fuzzer takes as input the program under test
prog, a set of seeds S , and a partial function fcost that maps program
states to cost metrics. When execution of prog reaches a state s ,
the fuzzer evaluates the cost metric fcost (s). For example, the grey
boxes in Fig. 1 practically define a function fcost for the running
example. Each minimize statement specifies a cost metric at the
program state where it appears. In other words, function fcost es-
sentially constitutes an instrumentation of the program under test,
which is typically derived automatically (see Sect. 4). In comparison
to traditional greybox fuzzing, this function is all the additional
information that our technique requires.
As shown in Fig. 2, the fuzzer passes explored inputs and the
corresponding costs, which are computed during execution of prog
with these inputs, to a learning component. Based on the given
inputs and costs, this component learns new inputs that aim to
minimize the cost metrics of fcost , and therefore, lead to optimal
executions.
As mentioned earlier, the cost metrics of Fig. 1 define optimal
executions as those that flip a branch condition. Specifically, con-
sider a program execution along which variable d evaluates to 0.
This execution takes the then-branch of the first if-statement, and
the cost metric defined by the minimize statement on line 3 eval-
uates to 1. This means that the distance of the current execution
from an execution that exercises the (implicit) else-branch of the
if-statement is 1. Now, consider a second program execution that
also takes the then-branch of the first if-statement (d evaluates
to -1). In this case, the cost metric on line 3 evaluates to 2, which
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indicates a greater distance from an execution that exercises the
else-branch.
Based on this information, the learning component of Fig. 2
is able to learn new program inputs that force execution of prog
to take the else-branch of the first if-statement and minimize the
cost metric on line 3 (i.e., make the cost metric evaluate to zero).
For instance, the learned inputs could cause d to evaluate to 7.
Then, although the cost metric on line 3 evaluates to zero, the cost
metric on line 4 evaluates to 7, which is the distance of the current
execution from an execution that exercises the then-branch of the
if-statement.
Similarly, the minimize statements on lines 6–7, 11–12, and 18–
19 of Fig. 1 define cost metrics that are minimized when a program
execution flips a branch condition in a subsequent if-statement.
This instrumentation aims to maximize path coverage, and for this
reason, an execution can never minimize all cost metrics. In fact,
the fuzzer has achieved full path coverage when the generated test
cases cover all feasible combinations of branches in the program
under test; that is, when they minimize all possible combinations
of cost metrics.
As shown on the left of Fig. 2, the fuzzer may still generate
program inputs without the learning component, for instance, when
there are not enough executions from which to learn. In the above
example, the inputs for the first two program executions (where d is
0 and -1) are generated by the fuzzer. Because the learner can only
approximate correlations between inputs and their corresponding
costs, it is possible that certain learned inputs do not lead to optimal
executions. In such cases, it is up to the fuzzer to generate inputs
that cover any remaining paths in the program under test.
3 GREYBOX FUZZINGWITH LEARNING
In this section, we present the technical details of our approach.
In particular, we describe our algorithm and explain how learning
works.
3.1 Algorithm
Alg. 2 shows how greybox fuzzing with learning works. The grey
boxes indicate the differences between our technique and traditional
greybox fuzzing (Alg. 1).
In addition to the program under test prog and a set of seeds
S , Alg. 2 takes as input a partial function fcost that, as explained
earlier, maps program states to cost metrics. The fuzzer first runs
the program with the seeds, and during each program execution, it
evaluates the cost metric fcost (s) for every encountered program
state s in the domain of fcost (line 1). Like in Alg. 1, each explored
path in the program is associated with a unique identifier PID. Note,
however, that the PIDs data structure now maps a PID both to an
input that exercises the corresponding path as well as to a cost
vector, which records all costs computed during execution of the
program with this input. Next, an input is selected for mutation
(line 3), and it is assigned an energy value (line 5).
The input is mutated (line 12), and the program is run with the
new input (line 13). For simplicity, we assume that the new input
differs from the original input (which was selected for mutation
on line 3) by the value of a single input parameter. As usual, if the
Algorithm 2 Greybox Fuzzing with Learning
Input: Program prog, Seeds S , Cost function fcost
1 PIDs← RunSeeds(S, prog, fcost )
2 while ¬Interrupted() do
3 input, cost ← PickInput(PIDs)
4 energy ← 0
5 maxEnergy ← AssignEnergy(input)
6 learnedInput ← nil
7 while energy < maxEnergy ∨ learnedInput , nil do
8 if learnedInput , nil then
9 input′ ← learnedInput
10 learnedInput ← nil
11 else
12 input′ ← FuzzInput(input)
13 PID′, cost′ ← Run(input′, prog, fcost )
14 if IsNew(PID′, PIDs) then
15 PIDs← Add(PID′, input′, cost′, PIDs)
16 if energy < maxEnergy then
17 learnedInput ← Learn(input, cost, input′, cost′)
18 energy ← energy + 1
Output: Test suite Inputs(PIDs)
program follows a path that has not been previously explored, the
new input is added to the test suite (lines 14–15).
On line 17, the original input and the new input are passed to
the learning component along with their cost vectors. The learner
inspects input and input ′ to determine the input parameter by
which they differ. Based on the given cost vectors, it then learns a
new value for this input parameter such that one of the cost metrics
is minimized. In case a new input is learned, the program is tested
with this input, otherwise the original input is mutated (lines 8–10).
The former happens even if the energy of the original input has run
out (line 7) in order to ensure that we do not waste learned inputs.
The above process is repeated until an exploration bound is
reached (line 2), and the fuzzer returns a test suite containing one
test case for each program path that has been explored.
Running example. In Tab. 1, we run our algorithm (Alg. 2) on
the running example of Fig. 1 step by step. The first column of
the table shows an identifier for every generated test case, and the
second column shows the path that each test exercises identified
by the return value of the program. The highlighted boxes in this
column denote paths that are covered for the first time, whichmeans
that the corresponding tests are added to the test suite (lines 14–15
of Alg. 2). The third column shows the test identifier from which
the value of variable input is selected (line 3 of Alg. 2). Note that,
according to the algorithm, input is selected from tests in the test
suite. The fourth column shows a new input for the program under
test; this input is either a seed or the value of variable input ′ in
the algorithm, which is obtained with learning (line 9) or fuzzing
(line 12). Each highlighted box in this column denotes a learned
value. The fifth column shows the cost vector that is computedwhen
running the programwith the new input of the fourth column. Note
that we show only non-zero costs and that the subscript of each cost
denotes the line number of the corresponding minimize statement
in Fig. 1. The sixth column shows which costs (if any) are used to
learn a new input, and the last column shows the current energy
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Test Path Input New Input Costs Learning Energyfrom Test a b c Cost
1 – −1 0 −5 C3 = 6 – –1
C6 = 3
2 1 1 −1 −3 −5 C3 = 9 C6 0C6 = 6
3 1 −1 −5
C3 = 3
C3 1C7 = 13 3
C12 = 43
4 1 −1 −5 C4 = 1 – 24 6
C18 = 47
5 3 3 7 3 −5
C3 = 3
C12 0C7 = 1
C12 = 35
6 3 3 −5
C3 = 3
– 1C7 = 12 42
C11 = 1
7 4 4 −1 6 0 C4 = 6 C18 0C18 = 42
8 4 −1 6 C4 = 48 – 15 42
C19 = 1
Table 1: Running Alg. 2 on the example of Fig. 1.
value of the algorithm’s input (lines 4 and 18). For simplicity, we
consider maxEnergy of Alg. 2 (line 5) to always have the value 2
in this example. Our implementation, however, is inspired by an
existing energy schedule [18].
We assume that the set of seeds S contains only the random
input (a = −1, b = 0, c = −5) (test #1 in Tab. 1). This input is then
fuzzed to produce (a = −1, b = −3, c = −5) (test #2), that is, to
produce a new value for input parameter b. Our algorithm uses
the costs computed with metric C6 to learn a new value for b. (We
explain how new values are learned in the next subsection.) As a
result, test #3 exercises a new path of the program (the one with
return value 3). From the cost vectors of tests #1 and #3, only the
costs computed with metric C3 may be used to learn another value
for b; costsC6 andC7 are already zero in one of the two tests, while
metric C12 is not reached in test #1. Even though the energy of the
original input (from test #1) has run out, the algorithm still runs
the program with the input learned from the C3 costs (line 7). This
results in covering the path with return value 4.
Next, we select an input from tests #1, #3, or #4 of the test suite.
Let’s assume that the fuzzer picks the input from test #3 andmutates
the value of input parameter a. Note that the cost vectors of tests #3
and #5 differ only with respect to theC12 costs, which are therefore
used to learn a new input for a. The new input exercises a new path
of the program (the one with return value 2). At this point, the cost
vectors of tests #3 and #6 cannot be used for learning because the
costs are either the same (C3 and C7) or they are already zero in
one of the two tests (C11 and C12). Since no input is learned and
the energy of the original input (from test #3) has run out, our
algorithm selects another input from the test suite.
This time, let’s assume that the fuzzer picks the input from test #4
and mutates the value of input parameter c. From the cost vectors
of tests #4 and #7, it randomly selects the C18 costs for learning
a new value for c. The learned input exercises the fifth path of
the program, thus achieving full path coverage of function bar by
generating only 8 test cases.
Note that our algorithm makes several non-systematic choices,
which may be random or based on certain heuristics, such as when
function PickInput picks an input from the test suite, when FuzzIn-
put selects which input parameter to fuzz, or when function Learn
decides from which costs to learn. For illustrating how the algo-
rithm works, we made “good” choices such that all program paths
are exercised with a small number of test cases. In practice, the
fuzzer achieved full path coverage of function bar with 372 test
cases, instead of 8, as we discussed in Sect. 2.2.
3.2 Learning
We now explain how the learning component of our approach
works. Even though this component is relatively simple, we found
that it is very effective in practice (see Sect. 5). Note, however, that
our architecture (Fig. 2) is configurable, and the learning compo-
nent may be replaced with any technique that learns new inputs
for the program under test from already explored inputs and the
corresponding costs.
Our algorithm passes to the learning component the input vec-
tors input and input ′ and the corresponding cost vectors cost and
cost ′ (line 17 of Alg. 2). The input vectors differ by the value of a
single input parameter, say i0 and i1. Now, let us assume that the
learner selects a cost metric to minimize and that the costs that
have been evaluated using this metric appear as c0 and c1 in the cost
vectors. This means that cost c0 is associated with input parameter
i0, and c1 with i1.
As an example, let us consider tests #3 and #5 from Tab. 1. The
input vectors that are passed to the learner differ by the value of
input parameter a, so i0 = −1 (value of a in test #3) and i1 = 7
(value of a in test #5). The learner chooses to learn from cost metric
C12 since the cost vectors of tests #3 and #5 differ only with respect
to this metric, so c0 = 43 (value ofC12 in test #3) and c1 = 35 (value
of C12 in test #5).
Using these two data points (i0, c0) and (i1, c1), we compute the
straight line c(i) = m ∗ i + k that connects them, wherem is the
slope of the line and k is a constant. This line approximates the
relationship of the input parameter with the selected cost metric.
The line is computed (using basic algebra) as follows. The slope of
the line is:
m =
c1 − c0
i1 − i0
Once computed, we can solve for constant k . Next, to compute the
value that the input parameter should have in order to minimize
the cost metric, we solve the following equation for i:
m ∗ i + k = 0 ⇒ i = − k
m
From the data points (−1, 43) and (7, 35) defined by tests #3 and
#5, we compute the slope of the line to bem = −1 and the constant
to be k = 42. Therefore, the equation of the line connecting the two
data points is c(i) = −i + 42. Now, for the cost to be zero, the value
of parameter a must be:
i = − 42−1 ⇒ i = 42
Indeed, when a becomes 42 in test #6, cost metricC12 is minimized.
However, as discussed earlier, the computed line approximates
the relationship between an input parameter and the cost. This
is because costs are evaluated locally, at every branch condition,
without taking into account the structure of the program until that
point. As a result, our technique is very efficient in practice, but
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there may be situations where the predicted value for an input
parameter fails to flip the target branch. For example, consider the
random seed input (a = 0, b = 0, c = 0) to the running example
(C6 = 3). Assume that input parameter b is then fuzzed to produce
(a = 0, b = −1, c = 0) withC6 = 4. According to the above, the line
that connects the two data points, involving parameter b and costs
C6, is c(i) = −i + 3, which means that for C6 to be minimized, b
should have value 3. However, if b becomes 3, the branch condition
that we aimed to flip (on line 8 of Fig. 1) is not even reached; the
condition on line 5 is flipped instead. We discuss the success rate
of our technique in flipping the target branches in Sect. 5.
Our learning technique resembles linear regression with the
difference that we learn from only two data points. Our fuzzer
could learn from all previously explored inputs that differ by the
value of the same input parameter. However, storing all these inputs
and then performing look-up operations would most likely not scale
for real programs, where fuzzing can generate tens or hundreds of
thousands of inputs in only a few minutes (Sect. 5).
Selecting a costmetric forminimization. Recall that, in order
to generate test #8 in Tab. 1, our algorithm learns a new input from
the cost vectors of tests #4 and #7, comprising theC4 andC18 costs.
In principle, the algorithm could use the costs evaluated with either
metric for learning. In practice, however, it could use heuristics
that, for instance, pick from which costs to learn such that new
branches are flipped (like the branch on line 20 of Fig. 1, which is
flipped only by test #8 after learning from the C18 costs).
Alternatively, minimize statements could be augmented with
a second argument that specifies a weight for the cost metric. A
comparison between such weights would then determine from
which costs to learn first, for instance, if C4 had a greater weight
than C18, the algorithm would prioritize the C4 costs for learning.
Weights would also make it possible to impose a search strategy
on the greybox fuzzer, such as depth- or breadth-first search.
4 IMPLEMENTATION
In this section, we present the details of our implementation. We
describe the characteristics of the code that we target, namely of
Ethereum smart contracts, and discuss the specific cost metrics that
our fuzzer aims to minimize.
4.1 Smart Contracts
In recent years, there have emerged various general-use, blockchain-
based [53, 66, 67], distributed-computing platforms [14], the most
popular of which is Ethereum [2, 10]. A key feature of Ethereum is
that it supports contract accounts in addition to user accounts, both
of which publicly reside on the Ethereum blockchain. Contract and
user accounts store a balance and are owned by a user. A contract
account, however, is not directly managed by users, but instead
through code that is associated with it. This code expresses con-
tractual agreements between users, for example, to implement and
enforce an auction protocol. A contract account also has persistent
state (stored in a dictionary) that the code may access, for instance,
to store auction bids. In order to interact with a contract account,
users issue transactions that call functions of the account’s code, for
instance, to place an auction bid. Executing a transaction requires
users to pay a fee, called gas, which is roughly proportional to how
much code is run.
Contract accounts with their associated code and persistent state
are called smart contracts. The code is written in a Turing-complete
bytecode, which is executed on the Ethereum Virtual Machine
(EVM) [70]. Programmers, however, do not typically write EVM
code; they can instead program in several high-level languages, like
Solidity, Serpent, or Vyper, which compile to EVM bytecode.
We have implemented a greybox fuzzer for smart contracts,
which works on the EVM-bytecode level and is being used commer-
cially. We implemented our learning technique on top of this fuzzer,
and in our experiments, we compare against the vanilla version
(without learning). It is generally difficult to compare against other
popular off-the-shelf fuzzers, like AFL or LibFuzzer, since we target
EVM code. However, on the running example, AFL does not achieve
full path coverage after generating 311M inputs in 12h, whereas
our vanilla fuzzer exercises all paths after generating 37’354 inputs
in 21.64s.
To test a smart contract, our tool generates, executes, and fuzzes
sequences of transactions, which call functions of the contract. We
consider sequences of transactions since each transaction may have
side effects on the contract’s persistent state, which may affect the
execution of subsequent calls to the contract.
Note that function fcost , introduced in Sect. 2.3, constitutes a
runtime instrumentation of the contract under test. Although the
minimize statements in Fig. 1 give the impression that we in-
strument the code at compile-time, we only use these statements
for illustration purposes. The design decision to use a runtime in-
strumentation was taken because a compile-time instrumentation
would increase the gas usage of the contract and potentially lead
to false positives when detecting out-of-gas errors.
In this paper, we focus on two types of vulnerabilities in smart
contracts: (1) crashes, which cause a transaction to be aborted and
waste assets paid as gas fees, and (2) memory-access errors, which
may allow attackers to modify the persistent state of a contract. We
discuss these in more detail in the following sections.
4.2 Cost Metrics
We focus on two different kinds of cost metrics, (1) ones that are
minimized when execution flips a branch condition, and (2) ones
that are minimized when execution is able to modify arbitrary
memory locations.
Branch conditions. We have already discussed cost metrics
that are minimized when execution flips a branch condition in
the running example. Here, we describe how the cost metrics are
derived from the program under test.
For the comparison operators == (eq), < (lt), and <= (le), we define
the following cost functions:
Ceq(l , r ) =
{
1, l = r
0, l , r
Ceq(l , r ) =
{
0, l = r
|l − r |, l , r
Clt (l , r ) =
{
r − l , l < r
0, l ≥ r
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Clt (l , r ) =
{
0, l < r
l − r + 1, l ≥ r
Cle(l , r ) =
{
r − l + 1, l ≤ r
0, l > r
Cle(l , r ) =
{
0, l ≤ r
l − r , l > r
Function Ceq from above is non-zero when a branch condition l ==
r holds; it defines the cost metric for making this condition false.
On the other hand, function Ceq defines the cost metric for making
the same branch condition true. The arguments l and r denote the
left and right operands of the operator. The notation is similar for
all other functions.
As an example, consider the branch condition on line 13 of Fig. 1,
a == 42. According to function Ceq , when this condition holds,
the cost metric to make it false is 1, as specified in the minimize
statement on line 11. This means that the distance from an execution
where the condition does not hold is 1, or in other words, if the
value of a changes by 1, the condition no longer holds. For an
executionwhere the condition on line 13 does not hold, functionCeq
defines the cost metric to make it true as |a - 42| (see minimize
statement on line 12).
Based on the above cost functions, our instrumentation evalu-
ates two cost metrics before every branch condition in the program
under test. The specific metrics that are evaluated depend on the
comparison operator used in the branch condition. The cost func-
tions for other comparison operators, namely != (ne), > (gt), and
>= (ge), are easily derived from the functions above. For instance,
the cost functions for the != (ne) operator are defined as follows:
Cne(l , r ) =
{
|l − r |, l , r
0, l = r
Cne(l , r ) =
{
0, l , r
1, l = r
In other words:
Cne(l , r ) ≡ Ceq(l , r )
Cne(l , r ) ≡ Ceq(l , r )
Similarly:
Cgt (l , r ) ≡ Cle(l , r )
Cgt (l , r ) ≡ Cle(l , r )
Cge(l , r ) ≡ Clt (l , r )
Cge(l , r ) ≡ Clt (l , r )
Note that our implementation works on the bytecode level,
where logical operators, such as && and ||, are typically expressed
as branch conditions. We, therefore, do not define cost functions
for such operators.
Memory locations. Recall that a smart contract may store per-
sistent state in a dictionary. If, however, users or other contracts
manage to access memory in this dictionary (either accidentally or
intentionally), they may endanger the crypto-assets of the contract
leading to critical security vulnerabilities.
As an example, consider the smart contract (written in Solidity)
shown in Fig. 3. (The grey box should be ignored for now.) It is a
simplified version of code submitted to the Underhanded Solidity
1 contract Wallet {
2 address private owner;
3 uint[] private bonusCodes;
4
5 constructor () public {
6 owner = msg.sender;
7 bonusCodes = new uint [](0);
8 }
9
10 function () public payable { }
11
12 function PushCode(uint c) public {
13 bonusCodes.push(c);
14 }
15
16 function PopCode () public {
17 require (0 <= bonusCodes.length);
18 bonusCodes.length --;
19 }
20
21 function SetCodeAt(uint i, uint c) public {
22 require(i < bonusCodes.length);
23 minimize (|&( bonusCodes[i]) - 0xffcaffee |);
24 bonusCodes[i] = c;
25 }
26
27 function Destroy () public {
28 require(msg.sender == owner);
29 selfdestruct(msg.sender);
30 }
31 }
Figure 3: Simplified example (written in Solidity) showing a
vulnerability detected by greybox fuzzing with learning.
Coding Contest (USCC) in 2017 [8]. (In the next section, we refer
to the original code of this submission as USCC2, with benchmark
identifier 22.) The USCC is a contest to write seemingly harmless
Solidity code that, however, disguises unexpected vulnerabilities.
The smart contract of Fig. 3 implements a wallet that has an
owner and stores an array (with variable length) of bonus codes
(lines 2–3). The constructor (on line 5) initializes the owner to the
address of the caller and the bonus codes to an empty array. The
empty function on line 10 ensures that assets can be payed into the
wallet. The following functions allow bonus codes to be pushed,
popped, or updated. The last function (on line 27) must be called
only by the wallet owner (line 28) and causes the wallet to self-
destruct (line 29), that is, to transfer all assets to the owner and
then destroy itself.
The vulnerability in this code is caused by the precondition
on line 17, which should require the length of the array to be
greater than zero (instead of greater than or equal to zero) before
popping an array element. Consequently, when the array is empty,
the statement on line 18 causes the (unsigned) array length to
underflow; this effectively disables the bound-checks of the array,
allowing elements to be stored anywhere in the persistent storage
of the contract. Therefore, by setting a bonus code at a specific
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index in the array, an attacker could overwrite the address of the
wallet owner to their own address. Then, by destroying the wallet,
the attacker would transfer all assets to their account. In a slightly
more optimistic scenario, the wallet owner could be accidentally set
to an invalid address, in which case the assets in the wallet would
become inaccessible.
To detect such vulnerabilities, a greybox fuzzer can, for every
assignment to the persistent storage of a contract, pick an arbitrary
address and compare it to the target address of the assignment.
When these two addresses happen to be the same, it is very likely
that the assignment may also target other arbitrary addresses, per-
haps as a result of an exploit. A fuzzer (without learning) is only
able to detect these vulnerabilities by chance, and chances are ex-
tremely low that the target address of an assignment matches an
arbitrarily selected address, especially given that these are 32 bytes
long. In fact, our greybox fuzzer without learning does not detect
the vulnerability in the code of Fig. 3 within 12h.
To direct the fuzzer toward executions that could reveal such
vulnerabilities, we define the following cost function:
Cst (lhsAddr, addr) = |lhsAddr − addr |
In the above function, lhsAddr denotes the address of the left-hand
side of an assignment to persistent storage (that is, excluding assign-
ments to local variables) and addr an arbitrary address. Function
Cst is non-zero when lhsAddr and addr are different, and therefore,
optimal executions are those where the assignment writes to the
arbitrary address, potentially revealing a vulnerability.
Our instrumentation evaluates the corresponding cost metric
before every assignment to persistent storage in the program under
test. An example is shown on line 23 of Fig. 3. (We use the & operator
to denote the address of bonusCodes[i], and we do not show the
instrumentation at every assignment to avoid clutter.) Our fuzzer
with learning detects the vulnerability in the contract of Fig. 3
within a few seconds.
Detecting such vulnerabilities based on whether an assignment
could target an arbitrary address might generate false positives
when the arbitrary address is indeed an intended target of the
assignment. However, the probability of this occurring in practice
is extremely low (again due to the address length). In fact, we did
not encounter any false positives during our experiments.
5 EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION
In this section, we evaluate the effectiveness of greybox fuzzingwith
learning on real-world smart contracts. First, we explain how we
selected our benchmarks (Sect. 5.1) and describe the experimental
setup we used (Sect. 5.2). We then show the results of comparing
to traditional greybox fuzzing (Sect. 5.3).
5.1 Benchmark Selection
First, we collected all smart contracts from 16 GitHub repositories.
We selected the repositories based on two main criteria to obtain
a diverse set of contracts. On the one hand, we picked popular
projects in the Ethereum community (e.g., the Ethereum Name
Service domain auction, the Consensys wallet, and the MicroRaiden
payment service) and with high popularity on GitHub (3’675 stars in
total on 2018-05-02, median 106.5). The majority of the contracts in
BIDs Name Functions LOC Description
1 ENS 24 1205 ENS domain name auction
2–3 CMSW 49 503 Consensys multisig wallet
4–5 GMSW 49 704 Gnosis multisig wallet
6 BAT 23 191 BAT token (advertising)
7 CT 12 200 Consensys token library
8 ERCF 19 747 ERC Fund (investment fund)
9 FBT 34 385 FirstBlood token (e-sports)
10–13 HPN 173 3065 Havven payment network
14 MR 25 1053 MicroRaiden payment service
15 MT 38 437 MOD token (supply-chain)
16 PC 7 69 Payment channel
17–18 RNTS 49 749 Request Network token sale
19 DAO 23 783 The DAO organization
20 VT 18 242 Valid token (personal data)
21 USCC1 4 57 USCC ’17 entry
22 USCC2 14 89 USCC ’17 (honorable mention)
23 USCC3 21 535 USCC ’17 (3rd place)
24 USCC4 7 164 USCC ’17 (1nd place)
25 USCC5 10 188 USCC ’17 (2nd place)
26 PW 19 549 Parity multisig wallet
Table 2: Overview of benchmarks. The first column provides
the benchmark IDs for each project in the second column.
The third and fourth columns show the number of public
functions and lines of code in the benchmarks.
these projects have been reviewed by independent auditors and are
deployed on the Ethereum blockchain, managing and transferring
significant amounts of crypto-assets on a daily basis. On the other
hand, we also selected repositories from a wide range of application
domains (e.g., auctions, token sales, payment networks, and wallets)
to cover various features of the Ethereum virtual machine and of
the Solidity programming language. We also included contracts that
had been hacked in the past (The DAO and the Parity wallet) and
five contracts (incl. the four top-ranked entries) from the repository
of the USCC to consider some malicious or buggy contracts.
Second, we identified one or more main contracts from each of
the repositories that would serve as contracts under test, resulting
in a total of 26 benchmarks. Note that many repositories contain
several contracts (incl. libraries) to implement a complex system,
such as an auction. Tab. 2 gives an overview of all benchmarks and
the projects from which they originate. The first column lists the
benchmark IDs (BIDs) for each project, while the second column
provides the project name. The third and fourth columns show two
source code metrics to provide some indication of the complexity
of the contracts under test: the number of public functions in the
benchmarks and the lines of code (LOC). Note that all contracts
were written in Solidity. Finally, we provide a short description
of each project in the last column. Appx. A provides more details
about the repositories and the tested changesets.
5.2 Experimental Setup
We ran our fuzzer both with and without learning on each of the
26 benchmarks. To compare the effectiveness of both approaches
for different usage scenarios, we selected three time limits: 5m
(e.g., coffee break), 30m (e.g., lunch break), and 3h (e.g., over night).
We focus our comparison on the following two key metrics: path
coverage and number of detected bugs within a given time limit.
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BID P PL B BL E EL SL FL RL
1 94 127 0 0 46520 56615 4893 822 0.86
2 68 79 2 2 68790 50176 3349 577 0.85
3 49 91 2 2 73941 46660 2652 879 0.75
4 55 102 2 2 82998 36466 3430 1067 0.76
5 47 69 2 2 67424 40371 3305 608 0.84
6 51 52 0 0 107831 109290 7791 1257 0.86
7 28 28 0 0 39765 34324 937 569 0.62
8 39 74 0 1 123474 116255 3844 534 0.88
9 73 84 0 0 81399 83091 5074 720 0.88
10 55 162 0 0 28236 25236 3771 989 0.79
11 95 184 1 1 34253 34182 5157 1196 0.81
12 67 89 0 0 35915 37858 4713 663 0.88
13 41 77 4 5 33445 27155 3202 592 0.84
14 62 84 2 2 50908 51232 3509 1117 0.76
15 84 100 1 1 87209 82338 4539 1249 0.78
16 18 17 0 0 188235 186627 2750 327 0.89
17 63 79 0 0 46906 54769 5126 957 0.84
18 49 78 2 1 58092 48794 4089 1776 0.70
19 61 74 7 7 83636 89522 3695 597 0.86
20 51 68 0 0 119444 90801 4809 778 0.86
21 24 28 2 2 163260 199974 2146 251 0.90
22 39 40 2 2 173082 134151 4677 718 0.87
23 57 82 1 3 125518 82929 5927 2058 0.74
24 20 25 5 9 215256 194288 3011 377 0.89
25 22 34 0 1 158859 168585 4865 670 0.88
26 37 68 13 23 54264 36587 1960 2169 0.47
Table 3: Results of greybox fuzzing without and with learn-
ing for 26 benchmarks (time limit of 5m).
As explained in Sect. 4.1, we focus on two types of bugs here.
On the one hand, we detect crashes due to assertion or precondi-
tion violations; in addition to user-provided checks and parameter
validation, these include checked errors such as division by zero
or out-of-bounds array access inserted by the Solidity compiler. In
the best case scenario, these bugs cause a transaction to be aborted
and waste assets paid as gas fees. In the worst case scenario, they
prevent legitimate transactions from succeeding, putting user assets
at risk. For instance, a user may not be able to claim ownership of
an auctioned item due to an out-of-bounds error in the code that
iterates over an array of bidders to determine the winner. On the
other hand, we detect memory-access errors that may allow an
attacker to modify the persistent state of a contract (see Fig. 3 for
an example). The fuzzers did not report any spurious bugs.
We ran all experiments on an Intel® Xeon® CPU @ 2.30GHz
machine with 8 GB of memory running Ubuntu 17.10.
5.3 Results
Tab. 3 shows the results of each approach with the time limit of 5m.
The first column identifies the benchmark, while the second and
third columns show the number of covered paths without (P) and
with learning (PL). We can observe that learning increases coverage
in 24 of 26 benchmarks, while only decreasing coverage slightly
for a single benchmark (benchmark 16). For most benchmarks, the
coverage increase is significant (up to 3X for benchmark 10).
Similarly, learning allows the fuzzer to detect 19 bugs that are not
detected otherwise. The fourth and fifth columns of Tab. 3 show the
detected bugs without (B) and with learning (BL). In contrast, the
fuzzer without learning only finds a single bug that is not detected
with learning (in benchmark 18).
BID P PL B BL E EL SL FL RL
1 263 726 0 0 150704 75472 6848 2468 0.74
2 104 202 2 2 287151 277622 11468 3193 0.78
3 119 197 2 2 231886 294640 11279 4216 0.73
4 122 183 2 2 227011 213853 8957 5113 0.64
5 153 153 2 2 184248 153015 6712 3313 0.67
6 52 53 0 0 606372 595179 16473 3206 0.84
7 28 28 0 0 220830 209444 4445 1269 0.78
8 68 87 3 2 613358 539998 11793 2623 0.82
9 83 88 0 0 449961 491465 21086 4095 0.84
10 110 239 0 1 197927 158557 11608 6044 0.66
11 170 228 1 1 174498 221989 12973 4213 0.75
12 87 92 0 0 232018 212204 12030 4464 0.73
13 64 79 5 5 189378 170803 6095 1516 0.80
14 92 123 2 2 220199 236748 11476 5789 0.66
15 106 120 1 2 475638 558284 23598 6729 0.78
16 18 18 0 0 1045947 1019000 9161 1057 0.90
17 78 79 0 0 272274 377359 17257 4109 0.81
18 71 79 2 2 293611 308228 11851 6237 0.66
19 79 82 7 7 386309 453576 13844 2208 0.86
20 57 115 0 1 629243 411287 15762 3138 0.83
21 24 28 2 2 820862 1094561 6783 816 0.89
22 41 42 2 3 967129 843334 15063 3191 0.83
23 74 84 3 4 496172 439086 14425 5710 0.72
24 20 26 5 9 1213700 1045862 8035 1157 0.87
25 22 34 0 1 890448 944219 13502 2363 0.85
26 88 97 21 23 214565 110071 4253 13947 0.23
Table 4: Results of greybox fuzzing without and with learn-
ing (time limit of 30m).
To evaluate the potential overhead of learning, the sixth and
seventh columns also provide the total energy (i.e., number of
generated inputs) spent without (E) and with learning (EL). There
are only 9 benchmarks where learning is able to exploremore inputs.
This could suggest that our approach generates fewer inputs within
the time limit due to the overhead of learning. However, note that,
for most benchmarks where fuzzing with learning achieves higher
path coverage, it does so with less energy. This shows that the
quantity of inputs alone is not a good indication of the effectiveness
of these techniques; better-quality inputs help achieve better results
in the same amount of time. Moreover, because the two approaches
explore different program inputs, with varying running times, it is
difficult to draw any meaningful conclusion about their overhead
based on the total energy.
The last three columns of the table provide more details on how
often learning succeeds in minimizing the intended cost. Columns
SL and FL show the number of successful and failed minimizations,
respectively. A failedminimization indicates that our approximation
of how inputs relate to costs is imprecise. Column RL provides the
success rate of learning. We can see that the success rate is 0.81
on average (between 0.47 and 0.9), which suggests that it is very
effective.
The lowest success rate is observed for benchmark 26. Manual
inspection of this benchmark revealed that the contract makes ex-
tensive use of cryptographic hashes (even during input sanitization),
a known obstacle for most fuzzers. For instance, exploring a branch
with condition sha3(x) = 42 is very challenging when x is an input.
Learning does not help in this case since the cost of flipping the
above branch cannot be approximated using a polynomial, let alone
a linear, function. Note, however, that learning can be very effective
for a branch with condition sha3(x) = y, if both x and y are inputs.
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BID P PL B BL E EL SL FL RL
1 1676 2333 0 0 294797 308163 18957 9016 0.68
2 254 452 2 2 1046123 1079040 30588 33326 0.48
3 306 422 2 2 865133 800498 23654 33444 0.41
4 268 498 2 2 833864 1229650 36689 33242 0.52
5 256 320 2 2 904658 891458 26586 33119 0.45
6 52 52 0 0 4097566 4011683 57385 14074 0.80
7 28 28 0 0 1391220 1330754 14011 6759 0.67
8 116 141 9 13 3507219 3229561 48816 18105 0.73
9 85 88 0 0 3021580 2799495 72604 15824 0.82
10 143 383 1 3 1083042 887115 35173 23128 0.60
11 230 362 1 1 1161930 1006539 56058 21007 0.73
12 93 95 0 0 1316578 1254882 40935 15647 0.72
13 77 86 7 7 1222064 1185722 25703 9146 0.74
14 178 200 2 2 924258 952175 35087 27784 0.56
15 247 244 3 3 2271856 1987588 66959 31137 0.68
16 18 18 0 0 5660256 5555393 42573 5048 0.89
17 122 132 0 0 1166845 1144578 38296 17339 0.69
18 74 90 3 4 2079860 2083114 45293 21738 0.68
19 94 104 7 7 1762548 2072935 49674 6948 0.88
20 149 194 1 1 1862167 1533119 45512 21766 0.68
21 24 28 2 2 4753217 6518330 27986 3770 0.88
22 41 42 2 3 5892858 5216357 63590 15279 0.81
23 86 86 4 4 2954445 2578311 45565 25320 0.64
24 20 34 5 9 7292754 6383068 34142 5656 0.86
25 22 34 0 1 5313742 5559319 59849 11199 0.84
26 118 130 23 23 540616 638028 13361 99340 0.12
Table 5: Results of greybox fuzzing without and with learn-
ing (time limit of 3h).
If we only fuzz input y, the expression sha3(x) essentially becomes
a constant and learning succeeds. Despite the relatively low success
rate for benchmark 26, learning is still much more effective in both
increasing coverage and detecting bugs.
By looking at the same results for the time limit of 30m (Tab. 4),
we can observe the same trends as for the limit of 5m. First, learning
clearly increases coverage in 23 benchmarks and achieves the same
coverage for the others. Second, learning helps detect more bugs in
8 benchmarks. In contrast, the fuzzer without learning only finds
one additional bug. The main difference between Tabs. 3 and 4
is that we now observe a slightly lower success rate of 0.73 on
average. We suspect that this is due to the fact that we are in a later
fuzzing phase where deeper execution traces are explored. This
can decrease the probability of minimizing an intended cost when
inputs also affect earlier branches in the program (see Sect. 3.2
for an example). However, as observed earlier, the effectiveness of
learning does not seem to hinge on very high success rates.
Finally, the results when running both fuzzers for 3h (Tab. 5)
confirm the same trends observed for shorter running times. With
learning, we achieve higher coverage for 21 benchmarks and we
find more bugs in 6 benchmarks. Benchmark 15 is the only one
where we achieve marginally higher coverage without learning.
Overall, our results demonstrate the effectiveness of our ap-
proach in achieving higher coverage and detecting more bugs
within the same time. The former can be observed evenmore clearly
when looking at how converge increases over time. In Fig. 4, we
can see a head-to-head comparison between the two approaches
for a few benchmarks. In all cases, our approach surpasses the final
coverage of greybox fuzzing without learning within a fraction of
the allocated time.
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Figure 4: Coverage increase over time. These plots showhow
coverage increases over time for several benchmarks (1, 4,
10, and 26 from top to bottom) without (dotted line) and
with learning (solid line). The light grey horizontal lines il-
lustrate at which point in time one fuzzer surpasses the final
coverage of the other.
We also compare average percentages of covered paths in the
Venn diagram of Fig. 5. In general, each approach covers paths that
are not covered by the other for some benchmarks. On average,
7.1% of paths are only covered without learning and 23.7% with
learning.
The effectiveness in finding bugs is even more apparent when
comparing the time until the same bug is detected (see Tab. 6 for
the time limit of 3h). With learning, we find all bugs detected by
fuzzing without learning as well as 13 bugs more, for a total of
91 bugs. Moreover, our technique finds 84 of these bugs within a
significantly shorter time, often orders of magnitude shorter. For
instance, our technique finds bug 7 roughly 200X faster and bug 76
600X faster.
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BID Bug T (s) TL (s) Bug Type
2 1 13.87 4.27 assertion violation
2 2 349.21 6.23 assertion violation
3 3 108.04 0.41 assertion violation
3 4 80.21 8.05 assertion violation
4 5 34.79 4.58 assertion violation
4 6 30.79 5.40 assertion violation
5 7 177.70 0.86 assertion violation
5 8 59.84 2.01 assertion violation
8 9 772.94 109.16 assertion violation
8 10 3855.90 3759.50 precondition violation
8 11 3155.58 3863.95 precondition violation
8 12 5619.05 3872.40 precondition violation
8 13 5376.11 3903.26 precondition violation
8 14 9105.55 4048.69 precondition violation
8 15 2197.09 4527.26 precondition violation
8 16 5136.98 5076.66 precondition violation
8 17 5532.67 5620.02 precondition violation
8 18 – 10106.65 precondition violation
8 19 – 10591.14 precondition violation
8 20 – 10761.62 precondition violation
8 21 – 10761.69 precondition violation
10 22 – 4956.65 precondition violation
10 23 – 6538.72 precondition violation
10 24 5227.82 8378.28 precondition violation
11 25 67.81 64.32 precondition violation
13 26 6.65 6.59 assertion violation
13 27 478.32 9.06 assertion violation
13 28 72.65 12.34 assertion violation
13 29 77.00 13.14 assertion violation
13 30 983.99 149.99 precondition violation
13 31 5595.70 4521.15 precondition violation
13 32 5496.02 4560.29 precondition violation
14 33 782.77 6.75 precondition violation
14 34 2315.15 13.30 precondition violation
15 35 234.56 59.38 assertion violation
15 36 888.85 809.24 assertion violation
15 37 2126.65 1894.18 assertion violation
18 38 109.41 14.45 assertion violation
18 39 9800.10 1164.70 precondition violation
18 40 4637.78 3354.51 precondition violation
18 41 – 3588.44 precondition violation
19 42 33.85 4.05 assertion violation
19 43 135.70 4.46 assertion violation
19 44 76.96 4.99 assertion violation
19 45 78.82 5.22 assertion violation
19 46 289.56 8.52 assertion violation
BID Bug T (s) TL (s) Bug Type
19 47 108.55 9.29 assertion violation
19 48 28.85 11.68 assertion violation
20 49 680.29 3848.78 precondition violation
21 50 13.52 4.56 precondition violation
21 51 39.23 8.51 precondition violation
22 52 2.44 4.54 assertion violation
22 53 76.48 5.05 precondition violation
22 54 – 299.63 write to arbitrary address
23 55 1152.47 10.11 precondition violation
23 56 200.87 36.48 assertion violation
23 57 1715.09 75.37 precondition violation
23 58 856.59 351.60 assertion violation
24 59 4.13 4.23 assertion violation
24 60 5.11 4.86 precondition violation
24 61 5.47 4.90 assertion violation
24 62 44.28 5.09 assertion violation
24 63 – 5.27 assertion violation
24 64 11.68 5.40 assertion violation
24 65 – 5.47 assertion violation
24 66 – 5.60 assertion violation
24 67 – 7.12 assertion violation
25 68 – 162.37 precondition violation
26 69 984.13 4.47 precondition violation
26 70 1894.46 5.02 precondition violation
26 71 182.78 5.11 precondition violation
26 72 77.20 5.40 precondition violation
26 73 55.15 5.49 precondition violation
26 74 1456.63 5.86 precondition violation
26 75 1798.79 5.94 precondition violation
26 76 3759.41 6.09 precondition violation
26 77 81.91 6.35 precondition violation
26 78 1184.34 6.53 precondition violation
26 79 54.60 7.08 precondition violation
26 80 802.26 7.19 precondition violation
26 81 1299.82 7.28 precondition violation
26 82 608.29 7.62 precondition violation
26 83 728.84 7.88 precondition violation
26 84 191.86 7.94 precondition violation
26 85 925.50 7.96 assertion violation
26 86 114.26 8.20 precondition violation
26 87 153.77 8.41 precondition violation
26 88 114.84 8.94 precondition violation
26 89 59.06 17.08 precondition violation
26 90 2345.09 28.85 precondition violation
26 91 134.04 34.44 precondition violation
Table 6: Time to bug (time limit of 3h). The third and fourth columns show the time in seconds until the bugwas foundwithout
(T) and with learning (TL). The last column shows the type of each bug.
6 THREATS TO VALIDITY
We have identified the following threats to the validity of our ex-
periments.
External validity. With regard to external validity [61], our
experimental results may not generalize to all smart contracts or to
other types of programs. However, we evaluated our technique on
a diverse set of contracts from a wide range of application domains.
We, therefore, believe that our benchmark selection significantly
aids generalizability. In an effort to further improve external va-
lidity, we also provide the versions of all smart contracts we used
in our experiments in Appx. A so that others can test them. Inde-
pendently, our technique is not tailored to target smart-contract
code specifically; for this reason, we believe that our contributions
generalize to other languages.
Moreover, our comparison to greybox fuzzing without learning
focuses on one fuzzer, which we implemented. We discuss this
below, as a way of ensuring construct validity.
Internal validity. Another potential issue has to do with the
internal validity [61] of our experiments, that is, with whether sys-
tematic errors are introduced in the experimental setup. A common
threat to the internal validity of experiments with fuzzing tech-
niques is the selection of seeds. During our experiments, when
comparing greybox fuzzing with and without learning, we always
used the same seed inputs in order to avoid bias in the exploration.
Construct validity. Construct validity ensures that the exper-
imental evaluation indeed measures what it claims, in our case,
the effect of our learning technique on greybox fuzzing. It is, for
instance, possible that engineering improvements to a tool provide
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without learning
with learning
Figure 5: Venn diagram showing the average percentage of
paths covered without (left circle) and with learning (right
circle) for the time limit of 3h. On average, 7.1% of paths are
only covered without learning and 23.7% with learning.
order-of-magnitude performance gains [56]. As an example, con-
sider the following two implementations: AFL does not achieve full
path coverage of the program of Fig. 1 within 12h, whereas our
greybox fuzzer (without learning) does so in only 22s.
It is precisely for securing construct validity that we compare
against our own implementation of greybox fuzzing without learn-
ing. The two fuzzers differ only in whether they use learning, and
as a result, we ensure that any improvements in the efficiency and
effectiveness of greybox fuzzing are exclusively the effect of our
technique. That is, no additional bias is introduced, for instance, by
different implementation details across fuzzers.
7 RELATEDWORK
Our technique is the first to systematically learn new inputs for the
program under test with the goal of increasing the performance and
effectiveness of greybox fuzzing. The new inputs are learned from
previously explored inputs such that they guide fuzzing toward
optimal executions.
Greybox fuzzing. Greybox fuzzers [3, 7] rely on a lightweight
program instrumentation to effectively discover new program paths.
There are several techniques that aim to direct greybox fuzzing
toward certain parts of the search space, such as low-frequency
paths [18], vulnerable paths [54], deep paths [64], or specific sets
of program locations [17]. There are also techniques that intend to
boost fuzzing by smartly selecting and mutating inputs [23, 55, 69].
In general, greybox fuzzing with learning could be used in com-
bination with these techniques. In comparison, our approach learns
concrete input values from previous inputs, instead of performing
arbitrary input mutations. To achieve this, we rely on additional,
but still lightweight, instrumentation.
Whitebox fuzzing. Whitebox fuzzers [19, 34], like dynamic
symbolic execution tools [20, 33], use program analysis and con-
straint solving to understand the structure of the program un-
der test and, therefore, explore more paths. This approach has
been implemented in many tools, such as EXE [21], jCUTE [59],
Pex [68], BitBlaze [62], Apollo [12], S2E [26], and Mayhem [22],
and comes in different flavors, such as probabilistic symbolic ex-
ecution [32] or model-based whitebox fuzzing [52]. It has also
been tried in various application domains, such as testing software
patches [16, 45, 58], complementing static analyzers [27], killing
higher-order mutants [37], and reconstructing field failures [38, 57].
As discussed earlier, our technique does not rely on any program
analysis or constraint solving and our instrumentation is more
lightweight, for instance, we do not keep track of a symbolic store
and path constraints.
Hybrid fuzzing. Hybrid fuzzers combine fuzzing with other
techniques to join their benefits and achieve better results. For
example, Dowser [36] uses static analysis to identify code regions
with potential buffer overflows. Similarly, BuzzFuzz [31] uses taint
tracking to discover which input bytes are processed by “attack
points”. Hybrid Fuzz Testing [51] first runs symbolic execution to
find inputs that lead to “frontier nodes” and then applies fuzzing on
these inputs. On the other hand, Driller [65] starts with fuzzing and
uses symbolic execution when it needs help in generating inputs
that satisfy complex checks.
In contrast, our approach extends greybox fuzzing without re-
lying on static analysis or whitebox fuzzing. It could, however,
complement the fuzzing component of these techniques to reduce
the need for other analyses.
Optimization in testing. Miller and Spooner [48] were the first
to use optimization methods in generating test data, and in particu-
lar, floating-point inputs. It was not until 1990 that these ideas were
extended by Korel for Pascal programs [41]. In recent years, such
optimization methods have been picked up again [46], enhanced,
and implemented in various testing tools, such as FloPSy [43],
CORAL [63], AUSTIN [42], and CoverMe [30].
Most of these tools use fitness functions to determine how close
the current input is from a target. For instance, Korel uses fitness
functions that are similar to our cost metrics for flipping branch
conditions. The above tools search for input values that minimize
such functions. The search is typically iterative, for instance, by
using hill climbing or simulated annealing [40, 47], and it may not
necessarily succeed in finding the minimum. While our technique
also aims to minimize cost metrics, it does so in a single shot. As a
consequence, it may succeed faster, but it may also fail to minimize
the target metric altogether, in which case it falls back on traditional
greybox fuzzing.
Programanalysis for smart contracts. The program-analysis
and verification community has already developed several bug-
finding techniques for smart contracts, including debugging, static
analysis, symbolic execution, and verification [5, 6, 11, 13, 15, 24,
25, 35, 39, 44, 49, 60].
In contrast, our technique is the first to apply greybox fuzzing
to smart contracts.
8 CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have proposed a novel greybox fuzzing approach
that learns new inputs from existing program runs. These inputs are
learned such that they guide exploration toward optimal executions,
as defined by the given cost metrics. We demonstrate that learning
significantly increases the effectiveness of greybox fuzzing, both by
achieving higher path coverage and by detecting more bugs within
the same time. On a high level, our technique is an instance of a
more general idea: leveraging the large number of inputs explored
by fuzzing to learn more about the program under test.
In future work, we plan to investigate other instances of this
general idea by considering different cost metrics and by exploring
alternative learning techniques, such as decision-tree learning.
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A SMART CONTRACT REPOSITORIES
All analyzed smart contracts are available on GitHub. We provide
changeset IDs and links to the repositories in Tab. 7.
BIDs Name Changeset ID Repository
1 ENS 5108f51d656f201dc0054e55f5fd000d00ef9ef3 https://github.com/ethereum/ens
2–3 CMSW 2582787a14dd861b51df6f815fab122ff51fb574 https://github.com/ConsenSys/MultiSigWallet
4–5 GMSW 8ac8ba7effe6c3845719e480defb5f2ecafd2fd4 https://github.com/gnosis/MultiSigWallet
6 BAT 15bebdc0642dac614d56709477c7c31d5c993ae1 https://github.com/brave-intl/basic-attention-token-crowdsale
7 CT 1f62e1ba3bf32dc22fe2de94a9ee486d667edef2 https://github.com/ConsenSys/Tokens
8 ERCF c7d025220a1388326b926d8983e47184e249d979 https://github.com/ScJa/ercfund
9 FBT ae71053e0656b0ceba7e229e1d67c09f271191dc https://github.com/Firstbloodio/token
10–13 HPN 540006e0e2e5ef729482ad8bebcf7eafcd5198c2 https://github.com/Havven/havven
14 MR 527eb90c614ff4178b269d48ea063eb49ee0f254 https://github.com/raiden-network/microraiden
15 MT 7009cc95affa5a2a41a013b85903b14602c25b4f https://github.com/modum-io/tokenapp-smartcontract
16 PC 515c1b935ac43afc6bf54fcaff68cf8521595b0b https://github.com/mattdf/payment-channel
17–18 RNTS 6c39082eff65b2d3035a89a3f3dd94bde6cca60f https://github.com/RequestNetwork/RequestTokenSale
19 DAO f347c0e177edcfd99d64fe589d236754fa375658 https://github.com/slockit/DAO
20 VT 30ede971bb682f245e5be11f544e305ef033a765 https://github.com/valid-global/token
21 USCC1 3b26643a85d182a9b8f0b6fe8c1153f3bd510a96 https://github.com/Arachnid/uscc
22 USCC2 3b26643a85d182a9b8f0b6fe8c1153f3bd510a96 https://github.com/Arachnid/uscc
23 USCC3 3b26643a85d182a9b8f0b6fe8c1153f3bd510a96 https://github.com/Arachnid/uscc
24 USCC4 3b26643a85d182a9b8f0b6fe8c1153f3bd510a96 https://github.com/Arachnid/uscc
25 USCC5 3b26643a85d182a9b8f0b6fe8c1153f3bd510a96 https://github.com/Arachnid/uscc
26 PW 657da22245dcfe0fe1cccc58ee8cd86924d65cdd https://github.com/paritytech/contracts
Table 7: Smart contract repositories.
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